THE EMPLOYER'S "INDEMNITY" ACTION*
RoscoE STEF:'ENt
No man, if asked, would give a warranty to his employer that he would
at all times, without exception, come up to the standard of the reasonable
man of the law who, so far as I know, when he is driving, never makes a
slip or a mistake.-Per DENNING, L.J., dissenting in Romford Ice and
Cold Storage Co. Ltd. v. Lister.'
IIEN

THE

Lister case reached the House of Lords2 the matter was

not put so baldly, but it was held, nevertheless, that a "lorry" driver
must indemnify his employer in full for the consequences of his
negligence. Lister, the driver, had been sent with his father, a co-employee,
to collect some waste material at a slaughter house, and, in backing up the
truck, had negligently struck and injured his father. The trial court found
that the father was one-third to blame for the accident by having failed
properly to watch out. Accordingly the full damages of £2400 were reduced
by one-third, 3 and it was this sum, £1600 with costs, which Lister was required to pay his employer.4
The trial court, thus, put the remaining two-thirds of the blame wholly
upon the driver. 5 It is stated in the opinion of Denning, L.J., however, that
the reason for the accident "was partly because the engine was defective, so
* The writer is indebted to Francis M. B. Reynolds, Bigelow Fellow at the University
of Chicago Law School, for help on the English law though it should be said, Mr. Reynolds
remains skeptical of the conclusions reached herein.
t John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
'[1956] 2 Q.B. 180, 187 (C.A.).
2Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd., [1957] A.C. 555. (hereafter cited:
Lister v. Romford). The case is ably criticized by Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and
the Master's Indemnity, 20 Modern L. Rev. 220, 437 (1957); and doubted by Davis, Some
Reflections on Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd., 33 N. Z. L. J. 187 (1957)"
3 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 8 & 9 Geo. VI, c. 28 (1945), provides
that where the plaintiff suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault, his claim is not
defeated, but the damages recoverable "shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks
just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage."
See generally: Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (1936); Williams,
Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence 162 et seq. (1951).
4 Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. v. Lister, f1956] 2 Q.B. 180, 181 (C.A.). (hereafter
cited: Romford v. Lister). This result has strong support: Jolowicz, The Right to Indemnity
Between Master and Servant, [1956] Camb. L. J. 101; Sandford and McMullin, Master and
Servant: Employer's Claim Against Negligent Employee, 33 N. Z. L. J. 252 (1957).
'Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 585 (H.L.).
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that the son had to keep it going fast and, therefore, reversed more quickly
than he need have done" and "partly because the son did not take sufficient
steps to see that all was clear." 6 Thus it would seem, as a matter of fireside
equity at least, that the employer, too, should have been required to take
some share of the blame. But this was not done.
FINDING AN IMPLIED TERM

Actually the case was brought, not by the employer, but in his name by
an insurance carrier. 7 And much of the argument dealt with the driver's submission that since the employer was required by statute to carry public liability insurance, and had done so, the court should find an implied term in the
driver's employment contract that he would receive the benefit of such insurance, and hence should be exempted from personal liability to his employer.8
But neither the trial judge, the Queen's Bench, nor the House of Lords could
be persuaded that this should be. 9 Not that they were averse to implying
terms in such a "contract," but that this was the wrong one.
The "implied term" on which the case was decided was very different, and
of wider significance. As put by Viscount Simonds: "It is, in my opinion,
clear that it was an implied term of the contract that the appellant would
perform his duties with proper care."' 0° He had not done so, wherefore the loss
was his. If this goes too far in the employer's favor, it can be said the alternative proposed by the driver went too far in the other direction, for he submitted that there was an "implied term" in the contract that the employer
"would indemnify him against all claims or proceedings brought against him
for any act done by him in the course of his said employment."" Even if
reworded to cover only "civil liability for accidental injury or damage," Lord
Morton said it was doubtful to him "if an employer would agree to it." And
if that is so, "it cannot be implied."' 2
8
Strangely it was necessary to reach back to Harmer v. Cornelius,"
decided
6Romford v. Lister, [1956] Q.B. 180, 185 (C.A.).
7 In fact there were two insurance contracts, one a motor-vehicle policy covering both
employer and driver against third party liability, and the other, an employer's liability
policy. The insurers paid under the latter policy, and became, as the court said, "the real
plaintiffs in the action." Id., at 191.
8 See Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 582, 583 (H.L.), where the two defenses mainly
relied on are set out.
9Of the members of the House of Lords who heard the case, two, Lord Radcliffe and
Lord Somervell, voted to allow the appeal on this ground. Their most telling point was that
if the third person had chosen to sue the driver first, then, when the insurance carrier had
paid, that would have been an end of the matter. The rule adopted by the majority, which
allowed recovery over, if the employer happened to be sued first, was said by Lord Radcliffe
to involve "almost intolerable anomalies." Id., at 590.
10Id., at 572.
n Id., at 583.
Id., at 584.
135 C.B.N.S. 236 (1858).
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almost a century earlier, to find any "law" on the point. There the court had
said:
When a skilled labourer, artizan, or artist is employed, there is on his part an implied warranty that he is of skill reasonably competent to the task he undertakes,Spondes peritiairartis. Thus, if an apothecary, a watchmaker, or an attorney be employed for reward, they each impliedly undertake to possess and exercise reasonable
skill in their several arts. The public profession of an art is a representation and under14
taking to all the world that the professor possesses the requisite ability and skill.
That seemed to cover the point. It was useless for Lister to say, as he seemed
to do, that he owed no duty of care whatever to his employer. 15
But the issue in the Harmer case was whether an incompetent scene-painter
could properly be discharged before the end of his term.16 The court held
that he could. Lister, however, seems to have been a "reasonably competent"
driver; he had been working for his employers for ten years, from age 17 to
27, except for time out in service, and for all that appears actually possessed
the "ability and skill" requisite to his job. 17 It is even very doubtful, therefore, that he could properly have been discharged for a momentary and unintended lapse of care or skill.' s And, plainly, any suggestion that the Harmer
case held that a competent driver is to indemnify his employer for the full
consequences of a lorry accident in such circumstances, is without foundation.
The Harmer case insisted on competence, not infallibility.
The dialectic by which an "indemnity" was contrived is deceptively simple.

First, Viscount Simonds asked the question: "Of what advantage to the
employer is his servant's undertaking that he possesses skill unless he undertakes to use it?"' 9 Of what, indeed? Then, since it was evidently felt to be
necessary to equate "skill" with "care," he continued: "I have spoken of
using skill rather than using care, for 'skill' is the word used in the cited
case,20 but this embraces care."' 21 Hence, there was an implied term in the

driver's contract-irrespective of what he might have agreed to,22 if asked24Id., at 246. To the same point see Robertson v. Wolfe, 214 Ky. 244, 283 S.W. 428 (1926)
"It is hard to see how Lister's case could have been presented less plausibly.
"6Plaintiff's contention seemed to be that, whether he was competent or not, he was
entitled to the benefit of a term contract. Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678 (Q.B., 1853),
had only just been decided.
17Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 557 (H.L.).
18This is a bold statement for many feudal notions still cling about the master-servant
relationship. In Baxter v. London & County Printing Works, [1899] 1 Q.B. 901, it was held
that damage to a machine due to a single act of forgetfulness was cause for dismissal. See
note 205 infra.
19
Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 573 (H.L.).
2
0Harmer v. Cornelius, 5 C.B.N.S. 236 (1858).
21Lister v. Romford, [19571 A.C. 555, 573 (H.L.).
2 Lord Somervell was more realistic: "No driver would undertake the work if he was told
his resources might be liable for damage caused by a negligent act or omission." Id., at 599.
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that he would hold his employer harmless from any loss which might arise
because of a lack of care on his part.23 If we accept the premise, "advantage

24
to the employer," the result follows quite logically.
The case being disposed of in this way, it was not necessary to give attention to plaintiff's alternative claim that, as a joint tortfeasor, plaintiff should
have full contribution from the driver under the Law Reform (Married
Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935.25 This was the ground, in fact, upon
which the trial judge based his judgment. But in so doing he was required
to find, as the Act provides, 26 that it was "just and equitable having regard
to the extent" of the driver's "responsibility for the damage"2 7 to give full
contribution to the employer. Clearly, that was a ground upon which reasonable men might differ. But the holding on appeal, that the driver impliedly
undertakes to indemnify his employer against loss, was something else again.
It made inquiry into matters of comparative blame quite unnecessary, if not
wholly irrelevant. The indemnity, perforce, made full recovery "just and
equitable."
Thus, a full stop has been put to such cases as Jones v. Manchester Corporation,28 where the court felt free-if not bound-to examine into matters
of comparative blame. It was held there that, as between a Hospital Board
and a Doctor Wilkes employed by it, ultimate responsibility for the negligent
loss of a patient was not to be ruled by "implied" contract, but by what was
"just and equitable" under the Act of 1935. Accordingly, although the Board
and Doctor Wilkes were both held liable2 9 to the plaintiff for the death of her
husband-for clearly there had been negligence on the part of the doctor in
administering the anesthetic-the blame, as between the two, was found to
be very largely that of the Board.30 The doctor, and her associate who was

23Id., at 557. The English courts regard an employer, who is held liable on respondeat superior principles, to be a joint tortfeasor with his servant. See the remarks of Scrutton, L.J.,
in The Koursk, [1924] P. 140, 155. And see Semtex Ltd. v. Gladstone, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 945,
949. The Act of 1935, which allows contribution, was designed to obviate the holding in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term R. 186 (K.B., 1799).
24It is doubtful that any different result would have been reached had plaintiff sued in
tort for the driver's negligence. If there is such a tort, it would seem to rest on the same
underlying considerations which produced an "implied" contract. See remarks of Lord Radcliffe, Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 587 (H.L.).
2See Romford v. Lister, [1956] 2 Q.B. 180, 181 (C.A.), where the text is set out.
26Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 557 (H.L.).
27Romford v. Lister, [1956] 2 Q.B. 180, 181 (C.A.).
2"[1952] 2 Q.B. 852. See contra, Semtex Ltd. v. Gladstone, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 945.
29The Board was held liable on usual respondeat superior principles.

30Dr. Wilkes, who administered the anesthetic, had been qualified for practice for 5
months; her associate and superior, for 2 years.
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to perform the operation, were admittedly competent, but without much experience, and none in the particular situation which developed. 3 Under the
circumstances, the Queen's Bench held that Doctor Wilkes should bear but
twenty per cent of the loss for her negligence.
It would be hard to say that the "law" of the Lister case, if applied, would
have brought a more "just and equitable" result. In fact, to the unversed it
would seem there must be something awry, even "anomalous," with a system
of law which puts ultimate responsibility upon "lorry" drivers and anesthetists, rather than on their employers, for the accidents which experience
shows will happen, at times, even to the most careful and competent. But as
Viscount Simonds pointed out:
The common law demands that the servant should exercise his proper skill and
care in the performance of his duty: the graver the consequences of any dereliction,
the more important it is that the sanction which the law imposes should be maintained. [To grant the claimed immunity] would tend to create a feeling of irresponsibility in a class of persons from whom, perhaps more than any other, constant vigi32
lance is owed to the community.

A MATTER OF GOOD CONSCIENCE
Truck drivers and anesthetists come off no better in this country. The
employer has an "indemnity" action, that is settled,33 but the theory of the
action has not been spelled out in the same way as in the Lister34 case. In two
of the most cited early cases-Grand Trunk Railway Company v. Latham35
and Smith v. Foran3 6 -no mention was made of indemnity, but the employer
nevertheless had recovery for the full amount of the third party claim. In a
third-Georgia Southern and Florida Ry. Co. v. Jossey3 7 -the same result

was reached, but here the court quoted from Story to the point that where
31
Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 579 (H.L.).
2Ibid. Nor would it do, evidently, to have two standards. Lord Radcliffe disposed of
that suggestion in this way: "[Ilf, as must be the case, he [the driver] owes a general duty to
all concerned not to be negligent ...it would be a surprising anomaly that, merely because
there was also a contractual relationship between himself and his employer, the standard
of his obligation to his employer were to be somehow lower than the standard of his obligation
to the outside world." Id., at 586.
3"Rest., Restitution §96 (1937); Prosser, Torts §109 (1941); Cooley, Torts 255 (1906);
3 Moore, Federal Practice §14.29 (1938); Mechem, Outlines of Agency §333 (3d ed., 1923);
Woodward, Quasi Contracts §258 (1913); 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §71.10
(1952); Harper and James, The Law of Torts 1363 (1956).
14 Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).
563 Me. 177 (1874).
643 Conn. 244 (1875).
1 105 Ga. 271, 31 S.E. 179 (1898).
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an agent violates his duties to his principal, and any loss thereby falls on
the principal, the agent is "bound to make a full indemnity.138
It is fair to say that these cases went off on simple principles; in none was
an indemnity agreement implied. To illustrate, in the first, the Latham3 9 case,
plaintiff's conductor had gotten into an altercation with a passenger, "repeatedly calling her a liar, etc., etc.," and it was held that for this "breach
of duty" the railroad had an action in assumpsit for the amount which the
passenger had recovered from it. The Foran4° case, too, involved a common
carrier; and there the court granted plaintiff an action in case against its
workman for having managed his smoking with "gross carelessness,"' 4 1 thus
causing a fire and damaging property of a third person which was being
transported. And, in the Jossey 42 case, the railroad was allowed a set-off
against its "baggage master" for the amount it had to pay a passenger for
the loss of her trunk. The agent had not only, by mistake, carried the trunk
past its station, but had then, unwisely and at his own discretion, put it off
at a later station, where it was lost. Plainly, if these were indemnity cases,
they were such only in the sense that contract damages were measured by the
amounts paid to the third party claimant.
It is true, of course, that had the plaintiffs in these cases chosen to sue on
an indemnity theory there were precedents from which a case might have been
made out. Wholly apart from contract, if plaintiffs could establish that they
had conferred a benefit upon defendants, by paying a third party claim which
in equity and good conscience defendants should have paid, they could recover. This was recognized as long ago as Moses v. Macfarlan.4 3 Nor could
plaintiffs be defeated by the rule of Merryweather v. Nixan, 44 which forbids
contribution between joint tortfeasors, for that troublesome case has been
held not to apply where one party is the active wrongdoer, the other merely
38Story, Agency §217(c) (9th ed., 1882). It is clear from the cases cited that Story, by
his use of "indemnity," was merely saying a principal may have contract damages, where
his agent or factor has failed to follow instructions (by negligence or otherwise) and a loss
ensues.
31Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874).
40 Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875).
41
Id., at 245. There has been considerable dispute whether a loss caused by smoking
can be charged to the employer as being within the respondeat superior doctrine. See Herr
v. Simplex Paper Box Corp., 330 Pa. 129, 198 Ati. 309 (1938). But in the Foran case, plaintiffs
were common carriers, and would have been liable "to the owner of the piano for its destruction
or injury, even though it had been destroyed in the hands of the servant with no fault of
his, as where the horses he was driving had run away. .. ." Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244,

250 (1875).
41

Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co. v. Jossey, 105 Ga. 271, 31 S.E. 179 (1898).

43 2 Burr. 1005 (K.B., 1760): "In one word," Lord Mansfield said, "the gist of this kind

of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
naturaljustice and equity to refund the money." Id., at 1012.
448 Term R. 186 (K.B., 1799).
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passive. 4 5 And many courts, following the lead of Metcalf, J., in Parsons v.
Winchell,46 have completely unblocked, by holding that the parties in these
4
cases are not in fact joint tortfeasors. 7
One of the most cited "indemnity" cases is Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Compania TransatlanticaEspanola,48 where Follett, C.J., said: "The
right to indemnity stands upon the principle that every one is responsible
for the consequences of his own negligence," and hence, without need of any
special contract, "if another person has been compelled ... to pay the damages which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, they may be recovered
from him."'49 The case had to do with the claim of a person who had been
injured through the negligence of a lessee and who, by some strange quirk,
had recovered damages from the lessor. Plainly it was not hard to give the
lessor, who was in no sense at fault, a recovery from the lessee by way of
indemnity. And this, on familiar principles, for surely it was implicit in the
court's use of "ought," that defendant lessee had received a benefit which he
could not in equity and good conscience retain.50
The cases upon which the court mainly relied were brought by cities to
recover sums they had been compelled to pay to persons injured through the
negligence of property owners. But, without much analysis, the court also
referred to the Foran and Latham cases, discussed above, as being within
the scope of the general principle. Since then, by a simple process of legal
metamorphosis, a general rule has evolved which requires "a servant or other
agent to indemnify his master or principal who has paid damages to a third
person injured by the unauthorized tort of the servant or agent." 5' 1 It is no
longer pertinent, evidently, to examine the agent's contract obligation; it is
not even necessary to determine whether equity and good conscience require
45See generally, Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 130, 146 (1932).

4659 Mass. 592 (1850): "But if the master and servant were jointly liable to an action like
this, the judgment and execution would be against them jointly, as joint wrongdoers, and
the master, if he alone should satisfy the execution, could not call on the servant for reimbursement, nor even for contribution." Id., at 594. See, as to the effect of a release, Horgan
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 208 Mass. 287, 94 N.E. 386 (1911).
4 In fact, some courts have carried the point so far as to deny that master and servant
can be sued in one action. See Raymond v. Capobianco, 107 Vt. 295, 178 At. 896 (1935).
Cf., Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F. 2d 35 (App. D.C., 1942), allowing joinder. See generally,
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 413 (1937).
48134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892).
4 Id., at 468, 989.
50 Or plaintiff lessor might have based his action on some theory of subrogation to the rights
of the injured party. See remarks of Cardozo, C.J., in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon
Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
51Rest., Restitution §96, Comment a (1937).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

a recovery. Those are matters which, if the principal is "without personal
fault," 52 are simply taken for granted.
Thus, by different routes, the English and American courts have come to
much the same conclusion. Of course, there have been strangely few appellate
cases. 53 Perhaps, in each country, that is because the law is so clear. It cannot be because a suit would not be worth while, for in a great many cases
the contrary is true.54 Perhaps, though, the employer-as in the Lister55 case
-has not often thought it "just and equitable" to force his employees to
bear such risks. Whatever the reason, a rule so far out of line with what
apparently goes on under it is in need of examination. Being fortuitous in its
application, it is difficult to live with, and expensive to insure against. 50
It would be possible, in what follows, to point out further wherein the
"indemnity" rule, as it has evolved, has not been a wholly inevitable outcome
of common law principles. The courts have made use of premises, some not
clearly stated, with which one might disagree. Their logic has not always been
impeccable. It is proposed, rather, to broaden the inquiry into other comparable areas of court-made law. In such context the rule, as fashioned out
of whole cloth for truck drivers, may itself appear to be "anomalous," and
57
within the province of the courts to modify.
THE

RIsKs OF

INDUSTRY

It is clear, I suppose, that losses due to carelessness or incompetence on the
part of employees may occur in at least three areas: (1) injuries to fellow
workmen; (2) to third persons; and, (3) to the employer or his business.
For the moment it will be assumed that the employer's right to "indemnity"
is the same, whichever area is affected, and regardless of the kind of tort
2 Rest., Restitution §96 (1937). This clause is the only stated qualification upon the
master's right to "indemnity." Apparently it was merely intended to exclude those cases
where the master may have directed or participated in the wrong. See also, Rest., Agency
§401, Comment c (1933). The writer spent one fine summer afternoon at North East Harbor,
when Comment (c) was written, insisting fruitlessly that the third person's action against
the employer is one thing, that of the employer against his servant quite another.
53The earliest report, cited here and in the Lister case, is Green v. New River Company,
4 Term R. 590 (K.B., 1792). But the holding in that case was merely that defendant's "turncock" was incompetent as a witness, inasmuch as he might be held accountable in some way
to his principal if found to have been negligent. Lord Kenyon did not say that-if negligent-he
must "indemnify" his master in the amount of the plaintiff's claim.
54 Millions of American workmen own their own homes and a car; there are assets enough.
5The Company made it very plain that it had nothing to do with bringing the suit. Romford v. Lister, [19561 2 Q.B. 180, 185 (C.A.).
"jolowicz' solution, however, is to require all drivers to carry insurance, thus making
many policies grow, where surely the employer's alone should suffice. See note 4 supra.
17See Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 592 (H.L.), where Lord Radcliffe said, "No
one really doubts that the common law is a body of law which develops in process of time
in response to the developments of the society in which it rules. Its movement may not be perceptible... but.., by some means, there is a movement that takes place."
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involved, or whether any tort was committed. The historical accident that a
particular careless action may result in a tort, while another does not, though
the loss is as great, would seem to make no difference. Perhaps this will need
further examination. In any event, it will be convenient first to look to the
bearing which the Workmen's Compensation laws have on the question.
Actually, had the Lister58 case come up prior to 1946, the employer's rights
would have been somewhat clearer. That is, by Section 6 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1906,- 9 the employer was entitled to be indemnified, at
least to the amount of the compensation paid. The House of Lords so held
in Lees and Another v. Dunkerley Brothers.60 In fact, the Lord Chancellor
went on to say:
I can hardly imagine a more dangerous or mischievous principle than that which
it is sought to set up here. It may be right or wrong to say, as Priestly v. Fowler61 says,
that a man is not responsible for the negligence of his agents; that is decided law, and
I make no comment upon it. But it is a very different proposition to say that a man
is not to be responsible for his own negligence.... Everyone must have an interest in
maintaining the law in a sense hostile to such a proposition, and I should think that, of
all classes in the community, workmen who work together in many dangerous employ62
ments, have the greatest interest of all ....
But the English Workmen's Compensation Act has been repealed and the
Industrial Injuries Act, 1946,03 which was adopted in its place, has no Section
6 regarding indemnity. As a result it would seem that the employer's right
is gone, that is, as respects benefits paid under the Act. The injured English
workman, though, may not only accept benefits under the 1946 Act, but also
sue his employer for common law damages, free from the old fellow servant
defense.64 Moreover, he apparently may keep both recoveries. 65 So, except
68 Lister v. Romford, [19571 A.C. 555 (H.L.).
19The same provision, in effect, was continued in §30 of the 1925 Act: "Where the injury...
was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer
to pay damages... if the workman has recovered compensation... the person by whom the
compensation was paid... shall be entitled to be indemnified by the person so liable to pay
damages as aforesaid... ." Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 84, §30 (1925).
60[1911] A.C. 5 (H.L.).
613 M. & W. 1 (Ex., 1837).
2Lees and Another v. Dunkerley Brothers, [1911] A.C. 5, 8 (H.L.).
61The new act substitutes "insurance benefits" for "compensation," with both employee
and employer contributing part of the cost, but the coverage of the Act, while somewhat
broadened, still uses in Section 1 the old formula: "all personsemployed ... shall beinsured...
against personal injury caused.. . by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment." National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 62, §1 (1946).
64Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 41, §1 (1948).
"Id., at §2: "The result of this section is that an injured employee's separate right of action
for damages is left unimpaired, and he is also entitled to retain insurance benefits received
but the measure of damages is subject to the provisions of this section." In effect this means
that "one half" of any benefits received may be applied upon those damages arising because
of "any loss of earnings or profits which has accrued or probably will accrue to the injured
person .... " Ibid.
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66

as this legislation may have had an off-stage effect, the Lister case had to
be decided according to the common law. In contrast, the situation here is
very different, for it was part of the basic plan on which the various Workmen's Compensation laws were promoted that, in return for a reasonably sure
(and adequate?) compensation recovery,67 the workman would give up his
common law action against his employer. 68 Of course this did not dispose of
the indemnity question, but it did shift attention to the immunity provision,
and to its scope.
One of the early cases-Peet v. Mills69 -was a common law action for
damages brought by a motorman against the president of the company for
which he worked. Plaintiff had been injured in the course of his employment
by a collision caused, it was alleged, by defendant's negligence in letting the
block signal system fall into disuse. Though the act did not go so far in express terms, the court held that the president was entitled to the employer's
immunity:
To say with the appellant that the intent of the act is limited to the abolishment of
negligence as a ground of action against an employer only is to overlook and read out
of the act and its declaration of principles the economic thought sought to be crystalized into law, that the industry itself was the primal cause of the injury and, as such,
70
should be made to bear its burdens.
Many Workmen's Compensation statutes, however, are now made more
explicit. The early New York statute, for example, was carefully worded to
preserve to an employer (who had paid compensation) a right by way of
"subrogation" against any person "not in the same employ" who may have
injured a workman. 71 The statute was silent, however, as to whether such a
right existed as against a negligent fellow employee and, in Judson v. Fielding,72 the court refused to hold on policy grounds, as was done in Peet v.
Mills, 73 that there was no right of subrogation. Shortly thereafter, however,
the legislature expressly provided that when an "employee is injured or killed
66Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).
67See the able exposition by Mr. justice Pitney in New York Central R. Co. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917).
68See Smith v. Lau, 135 Ohio 191, 20 N.E.2d 232 (1939), holding this to be true only
if the particular claim is covered by the statute. But see Moushon v. National Garages,
9 Ill.2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842 (1956).
6976 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685 (1913).
70Id., at 438, 686.
71
N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (Cahill, 1930) c. 66, §29. See Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 69 N.E.2d 557 (1946), extending immunity to a partner.

- 227 App.Div. 430, 237 N.Y.S. 348 (1929), aff'd 253 N.Y. 596, 171 N.E. 798 (1930);
Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 AMinn. 470, 23 N.W. 233 (1930); cf., Duncan v. Perry Packing Co.,
162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).
7 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685 (1913).
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by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ," compensation
is his "exclusive remedy."'74 And, in Caulfield v. Elmhurst Contracting Co.,75
the court said the provision "means just what it says and is a bar to an
action by an injured employee . . against his fellow employee. .... -76
Some statutes are worded to give immunity both to the employer and to
"those conducting his business." 77 As might have been predicted, there has
been difficulty in determining the scope of such clauses. The North Carolina
court, though, was surely on safe ground when, in Warner v. Leder7 8 it decided that the president of a company came within the provision. An employee who had been injured in a highway accident, caused by the president's
alleged careless driving, was accordingly denied a recovery at common law.
A closer question was presented in Nolan v. Daley,79 a South Carolina case,
for there the plaintiff, a brick yard workman, had been injured by the negligence of a crane operator in the same employ. But the court there also refused plaintiff a common law action:
We are not impressed with a distinction, which appears in some of the cases, that
the exemption from suit extends only to those employees engaged in managerial capacities, leaving a covered employee free to sue another employee who happens to be
doing the same or a similar kind of work.8 0
These holdings, still a minority, cut the ground from under any contention
that the employer should have an action by way of "subrogation." 8' The
opinion of Denny, J., in the Warner case, makes this very clear:
To hold otherwise would, in large measure, defeat the very purposes for which our
Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted. Instead of transferring from the worker
to the industry, or business in which he is employed, and ultimately to the consuming
public, a greater proportion of the economic loss due to accidents sustained by him
arising out of and in the course of his employment, we would, under the provisions for
subrogation contained in our Workmen's Compensation Act G.S. 97-10, transfer this
burden to those conducting the business of the employer to the extent of their solvency. The Legislature never intended that officers, agents and employees conducting the
82
business of the employer, should so underwrite this economic loss.
71 N.

Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (Thompson, 1939) §29(6).
App.Div. 661, 53 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1945).
Id., at 665, 29. See also, Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N.E.2d 252 (1945).
77 See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §72.10 (1952).
78234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952). See also, Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d
73 (1946).
79222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1952).
80Id., at 416, 453.
8t
The employer's "indemnity" action has become lost. Most statutes were drafted with
respect to the case where a third person, not in the same employ, caused the injury and
there, of course, "subrogation" was the appropriate term, for no right to "indemnity" would
exist in any case. However, a right by way of "subrogation" would also suffice in the usual case,
if the employer is to be allowed to recover against the negligent fellow workman.
I Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 732, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952).
75268
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Whether the negligent employee is thus relieved of all responsibility-the
supposed issue in the Lister8 3 case-is a question. Probably not, for it has
been held, at least, that the statutory "immunity" does not forbid common
law action for intentional wrong, 84 either on the part of the employer or of
a fellow workman. 85 Perhaps the line should be drawn right there,8 6 the
negligent fellow servant being held not liable, to anyone within the business
family, for the daily run of inadvertent accidents. But it is evident that the
Workmen's Compensation statutes have not been geared to make distinctions
of the sort, turning as they must on the exact measure of the employee's
contract obligations to his employer.
HE WHO ACTS THROUGH ANOTHER ACTS FOR HIMSELF

It is true, of course, that Workmen's Compensation is a matter of statute,
and it may be all well and good there to put the risks of industry upon
industry or, as in most cases, upon the ultimate consumer.8 7 But where a
third person has been injured the matter must be dealt with at common law.
Even so, why should it make any difference, basically, whether it is the
negligent employee himself, a fellow servant, or some third person who is
injured in the course of the employer's business? It is true the third person
is in no contract relation with the employer. He does not work for the employer; nor is he paid a wage. But the fact is that in the third party situation
the respondeat superior doctrine does put the risks of industry on industry,
at least in the first instance, s8 quite as effectively as the Workmen's Com83

Lister v. Romford, [19571 A.C. 555 (H.L.).
4 Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930). Cf. Duncan v. Perry Packing
Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).
8Mazarredo v. Levine, 274 App.Div. 122, 80 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1948): "The commission of
an assault by one employee upon another in the course and arising out of the employment
may properly be deemed accidental from the standpoint of the employer as an untoward
event not expected or intended. The same, however, can hardly be said for the perpetrator
of the assault. It seems unreasonable to suppose that the legislature intended to give statutory
protection in the form of immunity from suit for a deliberate and intentional wrongful act. We
have so construed the statute where an employee has been assaulted by the employer himself.
.. There would seem to be no reason why the same rule should not be applied to a co-employee
committing an assault on a fellow worker." Id., at 241-2. See, Horovitz, Injury and Death
under Workmen's Compensation Laws 336 (1944).
mMany statutes draw much the same line when they deny compensation to an employee
who is injured through his own wanton negligence or intentional fault. The guest statutes
draw a similar line, excusing the driver from liability, except where he was "under the influence
of intoxicating liquor" or where the injury was caused by "the reckless operation" of the motor
vehicle. See Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §321.494.
87 See the comments of Hand, J., in Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464 (C.A.2d,
1939), where he said that such losses are "part of the cost of production" and the statute
"throws the compensation for them upon the consumer. This is not because the consumer is
at fault... but because a loss shared among many is less a loss than if borne by one."
81It is Glanville Williams' position that the common law doctrine would alone have justified
the House of Lords in putting the ultimate loss on the employer in Lister's case. See note
2 supra.
8
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pensation laws do, and quite regardless of personal fault on the part of the
employer.
Actually, therefore, the thing might well be turned around the other way.
That is, what the statutes did-at least in the fellow servant situation-was
to extend the respondeat superior doctrine into an area where the courts had
refused to apply it. One may still doubt, of course, that the underlying philosophies are the same, but such doubts proceed largely from the confusion
of tongues seeking to explain,8 9 or to explain away, ° the respondeat superior
doctrine, while the accepted philosophy underlying the statutes has been made
quite explicit. 91
But Shaw, C.J., when deciding the FarwelP 2 case surely expressed the
prevailing view of respondeat superior:
This rule is obviously founded on that great principle of social duty, that every
man, in the management of his own affairs, whether by himself or by his agents or
servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure another; and if he does not, and an93
other thereby sustains damage, he shall answer for it.
94
That is, in modern phrase, the risks of industry are to be borne by industry.
The trouble with Farwell's9a case, as Shaw saw it, was that respondeat
S Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 49 (1920); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
9 Baty, Vicarious Liability 154 (1916): "In hard fact, the real reason for employer's
liability is ...the damages are taken from a deep pocket. The present is not a very propitious
time for withstanding a dogma based on such a principle. But a return to simpler manners wil
probably bring with it a return to saner views of liability, even if it is not sooner recognized
that to injure capital is to injure industry."
g See, for example, the remarks of Mr. justice Pitney in New York Central R. Co. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). And see Smith v. Lau, 135 Ohio 191, 20 N.E.2d 232 (1939), where
the underlying philosophy of the Ohio Act is discussed quite warmly.
92 Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842). This case, because of the forceful
reasoning of Shaw, C. J., fairly well established the "fellow servant" doctrine in this country,
in conformity with the "common employment" doctrine announced earlier by Lord Abinger
in Priestly v. Fowler, 3 Al. & W. 1 (Ex., 1837). The same result had also been reached previously by a divided court in Murray v. South Carolina R.R. Co., 1 McMullen (S.C.) 385
(1841).
93

Farwell v. Boston &W.R.R., 45 Mass. 49, 55 (1842). Judge Beach, in Wolf v. Sulik,

93 Conn. 431, 446, 106 Atl. 443, 444 (1919), stated the doctrine in similar words: "But theoretically as well as practically, the master's responsibility for the negligence of his servant
extends far beyond his actual or possible control over the conduct of the servant. It rests
on the broader ground that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others,
remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any breach of legal
duty on the part of such others while they are engaged upon his business and within the
scope of his authority."
91Blackburn, J., expressed much the same idea in Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265,

279 (1866): "We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape."

9 Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
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superior presupposes that "the parties stand to each other in the relation of
strangers.... ." But the injured fellow servant, he said, must maintain his action, if it could be maintained at all, "on the ground of contract." Moreover,
since "there is no express contract between the parties, applicable to this point,
it is placed on the footing of an implied contract of indemnity, arising out of
the relation of master and servant." It is idle, no doubt, to speculate why
the fellow servant's contract was not written to accord also with that great
principle of the law, "that every man, in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not
to injure another ....,,gBut it was not, and the job had ultimately to be done
by the legislature.
Indeed, the statutes went farther, as statutes are prone to do, for they also
gave compensation to the workman injured by his own negligence. 97 Nor
has anyone had the hardihood to urge that the workman in such case must
indemnify his employer for the loss. 98 The result is that if one were to write
an "indemnity" contract today, more comprehensive than that written by
the House of Lords in the Lister9 case, it would run to this effect:
In consideration of my employment I agree to indemnify and hold you harmless
from all losses arising because of any negligence on my part, in carrying out your
work, which may result in injury to a third person, but not for any such losses which
may arise from an injury to myself or (in many states) to a fellow employee unless,
in the latter case, the injury was caused intentionally or (possibly) by my gross
carelessness.
But why the incongruity; if the policy of the state is to put ultimate responsibility for industrial accidents upon industry in one area, why not in the other?
There is no easy answer, except to say that insight and understanding
come slowly. Perhaps the trouble lies with our notions of what makes for
liability. In the two-party situation it is ordinarily enough to say that the
defendant was negligent, the one at fault, and hence that he should be made
to respond in damages. That should teach him a lesson, perchance, and insure
greater care in future. But no serious student of tort law today would rest
his case on such considerations alone. Probably they never were a complete
explanation, for it was surely understood from the beginning that there is
another side to the coin. Of what possible utility is a tort judgment-either
to compensate the injured person for his losses (and thus to save society in
many cases from the burden of caring for him) or to dissuade him and his
91Id., at 55-56. One suspects that the courts of Shaw's day felt, and perhaps rightly, that
industry needed to be freed of such risks, as a sort of subsidy to encourage enterprise.
91Of course, the whole common law concept of "negligence" has been written out in
the area covered by the statutes.
98See Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Atl. 130 (1929).
9Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).
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friends from taking private vengeance-unless the judgment will also in most
cases result in an actual money recovery.
The structure, it seems, rests upon a presupposition that the incidence of
loss will generally fall on those in an economic position to bear it. In the
early cases, when a tradesman negligently ran' his horse and cart into a
pedestrian, injuring him, it was both just and realistic to put liability on the
tradesman. Not only was he at fault, but he presumably had the means to
pay. If he chose to conduct his enterprise in a risky manner-possibly to
make greater gains-what could be fairer than also to put the losses from
so doing upon him? It was not incongruous at all, therefore, when the tradesman retired to the sidelines and placed his servant in charge of driving, that
the tradesman should continue liable.'0 0 In Shaw's words, he must so conduct
his affairs, "whether by himself or by his agents or servants," as not to injure
another. It would not do-in a realistic world-to permit him to take away
the profits, which in ordinary course would answer such claims, control the
method of doing the work, and then, full of righteousness, point to the driver
as the real "wrongdoer."
To the credit of the early courts the idea that a person could limit his liability in this fashion seems never to have occurred to them. On the contrary,
they proceeded to formulate the respondeat superior doctrine, and a new writ,
that of trespass on the case, was devised to give the injured person his
remedy.' 01 But the employer has never ceased to point his finger at the driver.
And many writers, seeing only the personal negligence factor, as if in a simple
two-party case, have come to his assistance. The "tort," they say, is solely
that of the driver, from which it must follow, if the employer is to be held
at all, that his liability is merely a "derivative" one. Only the driver, they
say, is "morally"' 1 2 wrong, the employer, at worst, being merely a conscripted
"surety."
But is all this true? Judge Cardozo thought not in the case of Schubert v.
August Schubert Wagon Co.10 3 There it was urged that since the injured
100 See Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441 (K.B., 1698), where Holt, C.J., said byway of illustration:
"If the servants of A with his cart run against another cart, wherein is a pipe of wine, and
overturn the cart and spoil the wine, an action lieth against A."
1018 Holdsworth, History of English Law 449 (1926); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts, Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 520, 523, 526, 533 (1894); Green, Rationale
of Proximate Cause 19 (1927).
102Cooley seems to have based the employer's right to indemnity largely on the moral
factor. See Cooley, The Law of Torts 225 (3d ed., 1906), where he says, "the actual wrong,
.o far as it is one in morals, is on the part of the servant alone, and the company is holden
unly through its obligation to be accountable for the action of those to whom it entrusts its
business." The same view is echoed by Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 179 (1952).
But one's perceptions must be keen, indeed, to see a "moral" wrong on the driver's Dart in
either the Lister or the Schubert case.
103249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

wife could not sue her husband, the negligent driver, it followed that she had
no action against the company, his employer.104 But Judge Cardozo said:
The employer must answer for the damage whether there is trespass by direct command or trespass incidental to the business committed to the servant's keeping. In
each case the maxim governs that he who acts through anothr acts for himself.' 0 5
The statement that the employer's liability is "derivative and secondary,"
he continued, means this and nothing more: "That at times the fault of the
actor will fix the quality of the act. Illegality established, liability ensues."'10 6
THE NON-IFEASANCE CASES

These cases are another illustration of the dichotomy between liability and
fault. How can it be that an employer is held liable to a third person, while
the employee, who by his inaction made the accident possible, may not even
be subject to suit? Needing to find a personal wrongdoer, some courts, 10 7 and
some torts writers' 0 8 too, have struggled manfully to contrive a "duty" to
third persons on the part of the employee. It has not been enough for them,
to quote Shaw again, that it is the employer who must so manage his affairs,
"whether by himself or by his agents or servants," 0 9 as not to injure another. But, it is as true today as when Lord Holt laid it down in 1701, n10

that
a servant or deputy, quatenus such, cannot be charged for neglect, but the principal
only shall be charged for it; but for a misfeasance an action will lie against a servant
or deputy, but not quatenus a deputy or servant, but as a wrongdoer."'
To illustrate, in Franklin v. May Department Stores Co." 2 the plaintiff
had been injured in a revolving door, which someone had failed to repair.
She named the manager of the department store as a co-defendant, though
a dozen other persons from the board of directors on down may have had
some responsibility in the matter. But Judge Collet held that plaintiff had
failed to state a cause of action. Fault there was, and fault on the part of
104Some courts so hold: Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940).

105Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 257, 164 N.E. 42, 43 (1928).
Broom v. Morgan, 11953] 1 Q.B. 597, involved the same issue as was before the court in the
Schubert case, and was also decided for the plaintiff. The opinion of Cardozo, C. J., was quoted
with approval.
106Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 256, 164 N.E. 42, 43 (1928).
107See Murray v. Cowherd, 148 Ky. 591, 147 S.W. 6 (1912).
10 8Seavey, The Liability of an Agent in Tort, 1 So. L. Q. 16 (1916); laggard, Torts §98

(1895).
109
Farwell v. Boston & W. R.R., 45 Mass. 49, 55 (1842).
110
Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472 (1701).

WId., at 488.

11225 F.Supp. 735 (E.D.Mo., 1938).
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personnel, but liability to plaintiff was to be put on the corporate employer.," 3
In a sense these cases apply a sort of privity: it simply will not do to permit
11 4
third persons to probe around in a business organization to assess blame.
Of course, no one suggests today that the "artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,""15 which we call a
corporation, can do no wrong. Fiction here, in Holmes's words," 6 has had to
be accommodated to good sense. But in the doing of it we have still other
illustrations where liability is put on the proprietor, rather than upon the
agents who brought the loss about.ll't For example, there are such cases as
Dangler v. Imperial Machine Co.," 8 where the action was to restrain patent
infringement and to recover damages for the alleged tort. In the nature of the
case the infringement, if established, was the work of the defendant officers,
for they determined what was to be done and set the wrong in motion. But the
court said liability should be put solely on the corporation:
It is when the officer acts willfully and knowingly-that is, when he personally
participates in the manufacture or sale of the infringing article (acts other than as an
officer), or when he uses the corporation as an instrument to carry out his own willful
and deliberate infringements, or when he knowingly uses an irresponsible corporation
with the purpose of avoiding personal liability-that officers are held jointly with the
company." 9
To change the setting only slightly, consider the much debated case of
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 120 or its English counterpart, Candler v. Crane
Christmas & Co.12 1 In these cases it was ruled that a negligent firm of accountants could not be held liable to third persons who had relied upon their
113In Murray v. Usher, 117 N.Y. 542, 23 N.E. 564 (1889), an injured workman alleged that
the superintendent of a mill where he worked had negligently let a platform fall into disrepair,
causing the injury, but the court denied recovery: "[T]he agent or servant is himself liable, as
well as the master, where the act producing the injury, although committed in the master's
business, is a direct trespass ....
In such cases the fact that he is acting for another does not
shield him from responsibility ....
But the breach of the contract of service is a matter between
the master and servant alone; and the non-feasance of the servant causing injury to third
persons is not, in general at least, a ground for a civil action against the servant in their
favor." Id., at 565, 547. But see Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102 (1881).
14See Wall v. Howard, 194 N.C. 310, 139 S.E. 449 (1927), where the court refused to
allow depositors in a failed bank to sue the officers and directors personally for mismanagement.
M15
Marshall, C. J.,
in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 636 (1819).
"1 Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 49 (1920).

17 See Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497, where a theater manager was held not liable for
inducing breach of obligation on the part of the theater. See generally, Avins, Liability for
Inducing a Corporation to Breach its Contract, 43 Cornell L.Q. 55 (1957).
's11 F.2d 945 (C.A.7th, 1926). There is a conflict in the cases, as the court pointed out.
n1 9Id., at 947.

,-0255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
' [19511 2 K.B. 164.
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work. As stated by Judge Cardozo in the Ultramares case: "The defendants
owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract to make it with the care and
caution proper to their calling."' 12 2 But, as he went on to say, "negligence
alone is not a substitute for fraud," 123 and absent fraud, or gross carelessness,
the plaintiff had no cause of action. Again the torts lawyer would like to raise
a duty to third persons on the part of the firm of accountants 124 and, logically,
on the part of the particular clerk who was personally at fault, though they
do not appear to have pushed their case that far.
Of course, the legislature has now taken a hand, at least in the securities
field,' 25 and the law of Derry v. Peek 26 upon which Cardozo, CJ., relied in
part, has been reversed. 127 Directors, underwriters and others, who sell an
issue of securities upon a false prospectus may be held personally liable to an
investor, though they were innocent of any purpose to defraud. But, even so,
the rule of the Ultramares12s case remains intact. In all too many cases, if
officers and underwriters were not to be held, there would be no one who could
be made to respond in damages. It is not unlawful under the act of Congress
to put out an issue of securities with little else back of it but "the smile of the
promoters," providing there are no false representations. Investors, as a class,
it seems, need special protection.129
CONTRACT LIABILITY WITHOUT CONSENT

It may be a digression to turn from tort to contract, but that is not necessarily true. The problem of liability, as distinguished from fault, may perhaps
be seen more clearly in another context. At all events much the same argument has gone on in the undisclosed principal situation. Starting with notions
of contract liability worked out in simple cases, where the two contracting
parties meet face to face, it has seemed highly "anomalous" to some that
another person, the undisclosed principal, can also be brought in as a party.
In the very nature of things, Ames said,' 3 0 there can be only one contract, that
mUltramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
Bohlen, Negligent Misrepresentations, 18 Va. L. Rev. 703 (1932).
124 See Negligent Misrepresentation, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 355-57 (1951).
M2
See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L. J. 227 (1933).
12614 App.Cas. 337 (1889). The case was criticitized by Pollock, Derry v. Peek In the House
of Lords, 5 L. Q. Rev. 410 (1889); approved by Anson, Derry v. Peek In the House of Lords,
123 See

6 L. Q. Rev. 72 (1890).
127See

Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L. J. 171, 192, 198

(1933).
128 Ultramares
129 Some

Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).

states make a similar exception to hold an editor liable, though he may have been
without fault, and received none of the profits of the enterprise. Faulkner v. Martin, 133
N.J. 605, 45 A.2d 596 (1946). Cf. Folwell v. imller, 145 Fed. 495 (C.A.2d, 1906).
130
Ames, Undisclosed Principal-His Rights and Liabilities, 18 Yale L. J. 443 (1909).
Cf. Lewis, The Liability of the Undisclosed Prinipal in Contract, 9 Col. L. Rev. 116 (1909).
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between the agent and the third person. And, he warned, any rule to the contrary is so far out of keeping with "fundamental legal principles" that "it
should be recognized as an anomaly, to be reckoned with of course, but not to
be made the basis of analogical reasoning."'131
But there are other "fundamental legal principles" than those Dean Ames
had in mind. In the much cited case of Watteau v. Fenwick,"32 for example,
the plaintiff had sold cigars to Humble, upon the assumption that Humble
was the owner of the business. Actually Humble had sold out his interest to
Fenwick, the defendant, and, unknown to plaintiff, was merely acting as Fenwick's manager. On two-party contract principles, there would be no contract
between Watteau and Fenwick; they had never heard of each other, much
less come to an agreement. But the hotel was owned by Fenwick, and was
being operated for his profit. Had Humble committed a tort in the scope of his
employment, unquestionably his employer would have been subject to liability. There is nothing so sacred about contract principles, the court held, that
they too may not be written to provide for direct liability.
The basis of this liability, which is the significant thing, was made quite explicit in the early partnership cases. The "quality of the act,' 33 as Cardozo
would say, may be determined by what the active partner or agent does. But,
partnership existing, liability--either in tort or contract-may be placed upon
the other partner, regardless of fault or express consent on his part, and no
one has thought the result particularly "anomalous." The court in Waugh v.
Carver13 4 put it this way:

He who takes a moiety of all the profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law, be
made liable to losses, if losses arise, upon the principle that by taking a part of the
profits, he takes from the creditors a part of that fund which is the proper security to
them for the payment of their debts." 35
No doubt this was too broadly stated, as a general test of partnership," 36
but as a ground for fixing liability upon a master, a principal or a partner,
whether disclosed or not disclosed, it is both good sense and good law. One betrays a certain lack of perspective, it seems, to be squeamish about "liability
without fault."
13Ames, op. cit. supra note 130, at 443.
M [1893] 1 Q.B. 346.
133Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
13
1U [1793] 2 Bl. H. 235.
1Id., at 247.
"' See Cox v. Hickman, 8 H.L. Cas. 268 (1860). This case dealt with a composition agreement among creditors, to be terminated when their claims were paid. The House of Lords
decided that a taking of profits in such circumstances was not a conclusive test. Probably for
economic reasons, it has seemed wise to the courts to relieve lenders, landlords, and employees
from liability, notwithstanding they may receive a share in profits. See Steffen, Cases on
Agency 621 et seq. (2d ed., 1952). But nothing has been decided to say that Waugh v. Carver,
which dealt with an ordinary profit-sharing agreement, is not perfectly good law today
on its facts.
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DUTY OF CARE

It is not suggested in all this that personnel has no responsibility for losses.
For, of course, the contrary is true; it is the extent of that responsibility, and
the theory on which it is put, that are at issue. One point, though, should have
been made clear by the non-feasance cases, and cases of their kind; an agent's
responsibility within the business family should not turn on whether some
third person has a tort action against him. From the standpoint of the em137
ployer a tort loss due to the failure of personnel to repair a revolving door,
for example, may be quite as grievous as one resulting from a driver's failure
to back up a "lorry" carefully.'3 8 The circumstance that, in the latter case,
the injured person has an action against the employee, and in the other not, is
surely beside the point. The breach of duty to the employer may have been
quite as great-or as non-existent-in the one case, as in the other. "Negligence, like risk," we are told, "is ...a term of relation."' 139
One may not quarrel too much, therefore, with the House of Lords for having disposed of Lister's140 case on a basis of contract. 141 The employee's duties
42
to his employer, if they may be differentiated from those to third persons,
can perhaps be seen more clearly in that way. Also, it will be recalled, Shaw,
C. J., in Farwell's 43 case, ruled that the fellow servant's action must be maintained, if at all, on a footing of contract. But, if this is done, it must as a matter of even-handed justice, be done consistently. That is to say, if a truck
driver may be said to agree to hold his employer harmless from losses caused
by his careless driving, a store manager must also be said to contract in the
same way.' 44 He, too, must not only possess the "ability and skill" requisite to
his job, but, to use Viscount Simond's language in the Lister case, he too surely "undertakes to use" his skill, for otherwise it would be of no possible "ad45
vantage to the employer.'1
Note 112 supra.
117

8
13
Note 2 supra.

13 Cardozo, CJ., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
140
Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).
14 1

Denning, L.J., took strong exception to this way of deciding the case, presumably
because it ruled out any consideration of what was "just and equitable" in the circumstances.
Romford v. Lister [1956] 2 Q.B. 180, 187. But the case on which he mainly relied, Wilsons
& Clyde Coal Co. v. English, [19381 A.C. 57, which decided that the employer was under
obligation to its employees to maintain safe working conditions, had a strong flavor of contract.
142Lord Radcliffe thought this would be "a surprising anomaly" (see note 32 supra),
but his attention had not been called to the non-feasance cases.
4

I Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
144The point was recognized by Cardozo, C.J., in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y.
170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931), when he said: "The defendants owed to their employer
a duty imposed by law to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of
contract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling."

14 Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (I.L.).
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Logically, of course, there is no place to stop. Directors also, it would seem,
must warrant that they possess,1 46 and will use without fail, the "ability and
skill"'147 requisite to manage the corporate businesses put in their charge.
They, too, must not be encouraged in "a feeling of irresponsibility," 48 for
their capacity to do harm in the community is even greater than that of truck
drivers or store managers. But, if this is true, the courts-including the House
of Lords-have been most derelict in holding them to their duties.
Of course, the director's case does not come up, ordinarily, in the immediate
context of a personal injury suit; the matter of liability, if any, takes on a
neutral pecuniary hue. Nor do directors arouse those parental feelings of discipline, to be administered regretfully but resolutely, for the servant's good.
Directors have been treated most considerately. But, perhaps for this reason,
the courts have come closer to the mark in their case than elsewhere.
At all events, in the carefully considered case of Overend & Gurney Co. v.
Gibb,"49
' the House of Lords stated the director's contract in very different
terms. The defendant there was charged with having put the funds entrusted
to him into an insolvent venture, after having learned of facts which should
have brought matters to a halt. But, to make out a case, Lord Hatherley said
it must be shown that there was "crassa negligentia" 50° on the director's part.
That is, assuming the directors had not "exceeded the powers entrusted to
them," the question was whether
they were cognisant of circumstances of such a character, so plain, so manifest, and
so simple of appreciation, that no men with any ordinary degree of prudence acting
on their own behalf, would have entered into such a transaction as they entered
into?' 51
If not, plaintiffs must lose-and they did.
It is not necessary to belabor the point, for it is evident that the test used
in Gibb's case was much more generous than in Lister's. Of course, the "gross
negligence" test has been criticized, both as a matter of dialectic and of substance. It was pointed out long ago by Rolfe, B., in Wilson v. Brett, 52 that
"gross negligence is the same thing as 'negligence' with the addition of a
vituperative adjective."' 5 3 The criticism had the approval of Power, J., in Re
The City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.,15 4 with this qualification:
I confess to feeling some difficulty in understanding the difference between negligence
and gross negligence, except in so far as the expressions are used for the purpose
of a distinction between the duty that is owed in one case and the duty that is owed in
another.' 55
141It was so held in Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
' 47 Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).

Ibid.

M. & W. 113 (Ex., 1843).

148

15211

14L.R. 5 H.L. 480 (1872).

15'
Id., at 115.
-4 [1925] Ch. 407 (C.A.).
ul Id.. at 427.

150

Id., at 487.
I Id., at 487.
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At most this is a lawyer's quibble. It is true that if "negligence" is a term
which always signifies liability, the use of "gross" or "culpable" adds nothing.
But the point is that in the director's case "negligence" does not result in
liability; there must be something different, to wit: "gross negligence." Or, if
you will, a director must really be quite careless, before he may be held liable
to his company.
But, even when stated as a matter of duty, there is criticism, for it is said
that directors should be required to meet a higher, not a lower, standard of
care.' 56 In part this has proceeded from an unwillingness to grant that directors have only limited duties. 157 But, even if directors were to be selected with
greater attention to skill and ability, and should be given greater responsibilities, it is by no means clear that the "gross negligence" test would be a bad
one.
Of course, the term by itself is misleading; the gist of the test lies in the
standard of comparison. In Gibb's' 1s case there was no disposition at all to
adopt that of the reasonable man of the law, who can never make a mistake.
Directors, most assuredly, are not guarantors. Rather, the House of Lords
said, they should be liable only if the questioned transaction was one which
"no men with any ordinary degree of prudence acting on their own behalf,
would have entered into[.]'

15 9

Directors are not business owners, but agents. 160 Nevertheless, within charter restrictions, they enjoy much the same freedom of action as an individual
proprietor would have, and should be encouraged to take the risks that he
would take. It would be quite unreasonable to charge them with personal
liability for so doing. At all events, the test, however loosely stated, is plainly
designed to draw a line-in the negligence area-between what may be called
business risks, on the one hand, and those, on the other, which arise when a
director has made the risk his own, so to speak. Beyond this, if a director has
no purpose honestly to forward his principal's business, 161 or acts fraudulently, 6 2 or without regard to charter restrictions,
1

6

3

or serves his own inter-

"See Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 Yale L. J. 33 (1907).
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1934). Cf. A Defense
of Non-Managing Directors, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 668, 671 (1938).
15 Overend & Guerney Co. v. Gibb, L.R. 5 H.L. 480 (1872).
M9Id., at 487.
110
See Steffen, What Now About Agency? 5 J. of Legal Ed. 26 (1952).
16"Directors are bound to use fair and reasonable diligence in the discharge of their
duties and to act honestly." Per Jessel, M.R., in Re Forest of Dean etc. Co., 10 Ch.D. 450,
452 (1878).
12 See cases cited, Palmer's, Company Law 190 et seq. (19th ed., 1949).
13
1 Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 98 N.E. 781 (1912).
6
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165
there is
ests before those of his principal, 164 or simply fails to do anything,
no dearth of authority to hold him liable.

SKnLt "Em :RAcEs" CARE
It is time to look more carefully at the contract which has been written for
"lorry" drivers, and their sort. Plainly it is most incongruous. Of course, the
166
driver is no director; be is held to a much higher standard of competence,
17
But, putting such
for one thing, and, for another, he works much harder.
matters aside, it is a mistake to say that it is only the director who has to
make decisions calling for initiative and good judgment. The truck driver on
the road, under orders to make a schedule, perhaps furnished with defective
equipment, makes more decisions of the kind per mile, than many directors do
in a month. Whether or not to pass the car ahead, and thus to forward the employer's affairs, involves serious business risk, and surely calls for skill and
good judgment. Why then does the "law" say that if the driver makes even
one mistake, it is at his risk; while any good faith error on the part of a
director merely results in a "business" loss?
The answer, perhaps, is the ancient one that a money sanction, it is supposed, must be imposed in the servant's case, to insure greater care. Clearly
5
the decision of the House of Lords in Lister's6 case was influenced by this
16 9
But, if any one thing has been established by our experience
consideration.
with Workman's Compensation over the last half century, it is that the way
170
to reduce industrial accidents is to put the principal sanction on industry.
It is the employer, not the employee, who can take the steps-by the inauguration of training programs, the purchase of improved equipment and so
Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del.Ch. 138, 2 A.2d. 225 (1938), aff'd. 23 Del.Ch. 235, 5
A.2d 503 (1939); Kaufman v. Wolfson, 153 F.Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y., 1957).
1 Per Lord Hardwick , L.C., Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405 (1742).
'"See the remarks of Neville, J., In Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations, etc., Ltd., [1911]
1 Ch. 425, 437; a director may properly "undertake the management of a rubber company
in complete ignorance of everything connected with rubber, without incurring responsibility
for the mistakes which may result from such ignorance." Also, of judge L. Hand in Barnes
v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y., 1924): "Directors are not specialists, like lawyers or doctors. They must have good sense, perhaps they must have acquaintance with affairs; but
they need not-indeed, perhaps they should not-have any technical talent." Id., at 618.
board meetings or that he take part in
167It is not essential, in fact, that he attend all
every transaction which is considered at those meetings which he does attend. Per Jessel,
M.R., in Re Forest of Dean etc. Co., 10 Ch.D. 450, 452 (1878).
8
Lister v. Romford, [19571 A.C. 555 (H.L.).
'1
169Id., at 579.
170
See Reede, Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation 324 (1947): "All available evidence
supports the view that workmen's compensation is a stimulus to prevention of industrial
injuries. It will be noted later that categorical statistical demonstration of prevention is impossible, but that other evidence, including related statistical indications, is reasonably
conclusive."
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on-which alone will effectually reduce accidents. Moreover, as only a little
analysis would show, there is no suggestion that there should not be any money
sanction. The driver who is grossly or intentionally careless, or who acts without cause contrary to instructions, or who has no purpose to serve his employer, is surely liable-just as a director would be. It is doubtful that any
greater sanction would have additional deterrent value. 171
But, even so, how is it possible to escape the force of Viscount Simond's
reasoning? It is true, as he says, that a "lorry" driver, or an accountant, professes to his employer, at least,' 7 2 that he possesses the "ability and skill"

requisite to his job. So also, the second step in the argument would seem to be
sound, for surely drivers and accountants "undertake to use"' 7 3 their ability
and skill. The fallacy, if any, therefore, must lie in the conclusion, that every
failure to use their "ability and skill" is a breach of contract. This, surely, is a
non sequitur; "skill" may not be made so easily to embrace "care." The director cases alone should establish the point, for directors too must agree to use
the ability and skill requisite to their job, and yet, their contract has not been
construed to call for infallibility. They must use their skill and ability, must
act honestly in furtherance of the company's business, but no one suggests that
they agree never to make a mistake.
It may fairly be said, therefore, that the "lorry" driver undertakes to use his
skill and ability only with that degree of care which other competent drivers
use in similar circumstances. Or perhaps the matter should be put the other
way round, as Lord Hatherley did in Overend & Gurney Co. v. Gibb,174 that
is, the question is whether no driver with any ordinary degree of prudence,
having equal competence and experience, using the same equipment, and under the same instructions, would ever have had such an accident in the course
of his work.
What Viscount Simonds and his colleagues failed to see, it seems, is that
"lorry" drivers are not independent contractors, who, indeed, could be held to
full responsibility. 75 But contractors demand to be free from control as to the
7
1 1It would be interesting to see a psychological study of what goes on in a truck driver's
mind while on the road-and not on a "frolic," for that would be a different matter. It may
be doubted that he makes fine distinctions between gross and ordinary carelessness. From
private sources it is gathered that, in his words, he simply does not want to do anything to
get "a teat in the wringer." For this reason, and because he takes pride in his ability and
skill, he tries to do a "good job."
12 The non-feasance cases, see discussion in text at 480 supra, establish that he does
not necessarily make a profession to the world.
173
Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 586 (H.L.).
174
L.R. 5 H.L. 480 (1872).
175See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1935).
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manner in which their work is done;'1 6 also as to the equipment they shall
use; and, of greater significance, 177 are ordinarily able to exact a fee'178 for
their work calculated to cover incidental risks and yet return a profit. Plainly
the choice is the employer's to make, either to buy insulation at market rates,
or to so conduct his own affairs, "whether by himself or by his agents or
servants," as not to injure another.
"FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF

His OwN

NEGLIGENCE"

Had Lord Hatherley's test been applied in Lister's'7 9 case, the result might
very well have been different. Certainly the fact that Lister was given a
crotchety truck to drive would have figured in the calculations. What his instructions were for the morning, might also have been significant, particularly
if, as is not unusual, he was under special pressures to get on with the job. As
for competence, though, there is no reason to suppose that Lister was not satisfactory to his employers. Otherwise, in the course of his ten years of service,
he would long since have been discharged or, more likely, transferred to other
work. Whatever Lister may have "professed" to his employers, when hired,
was immaterial; they must have known exactly what his abilities were, well
before the time of the accident. Harmer v. Cornelius'"0 decided nothing to the
contrary. Thus, so far as appears, there was no breach of contract on Lister's
part, unless, indeed, it could be shown that no other driver of equal ability,
driving a similarly defective truck, and using all ordinary prudence in the circumstances, would ever have had such an accident.
In plain words, this means that the daily run of inadvertent accidents and
mistakes which seem inevitably to occur in a business day, are "business
risks." Other tests may be proposed than that contrived by Lord Hatherley,
16 Control, or right to control, may very well be significant only as an evidence of the fact
that it is the employer who has the benefit of the work. That is, profit-taking established,

control follows as an incident. See Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash. 2d 561, 143 P.2d 554 (1943).
177 See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584, 595
(1929).
178 Shaw, C. J. ,in Farwell's case, assumed that the injured servant had bargained for a wage
sufficient to permit him to carry the risk of injury by a fellow servant. No evidence has ever been
adduced to establish the point, but the Workmen's Compensation statutes were predicated
on the assumption that this is not true. As a matter of simple logic, of course, Shaw, C.J.,
could quite as validly have assumed the opposite proposition, that the employer was paying
a lower wage in order that he could assume ultimate responsibility for the carelessness of
fellow servants.
179 Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).
180
5 C.B.N.S. 236 (1858). In the Harmer case the plaintiff, a scene-painter, was discharged
within the first two or three days of his employment. In that context a workman truly does
profess the competence of his calling. But an employment relationship is a continuing one,
and just as the employee is asked to accept the changing duties and conditions of work,
so the employer accepts the workman, after a trial period, for what he knows his abilities to be.
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but he came close to the essence of the thing. After all, it is the employer who,
for his own gain, sends a fallible human being out to do his work, using the
employer's machines, and following his instructions. If one must assess "moral"
blame, therefore, it might well be put on the employer. 81 His is the opportunity to minimize risk, by employing better-trained men, supplying better
equipment, easing the demand for hurry.
What then, of the broad principle announced by Follett, C.J., in the
Oceanic'82 case, "that every one is responsible for the consequences of his own
negligence[?] '1 83 In the sense that the negligent driver may be held in damages
by the injured third person, it is, of course, a truism. Perhaps some day, in
limited areas, a system of insurance 84 may be set up which would obviate this
result, but that day is not yet. The injured third person still may recover of
either employer or employee. But it will not do to say, as Follett, C.J., did,
that, since the action in either case is based on the driver's "negligence," it
must follow that, if the employer has had to pay the third person, he may
recover his losses from the driver, as "damages which ought to have been paid
by the wrongdoer."' 8 5
If the employer is to pitch his case on this ground, it has been essential since
long ago,' 8 6 that it be "just and equitable." It is not enough that, as respects
third persons, the driver is a "wrongdoer." So, too, in a sense, is the employer,
if it is just a matter of name-calling. The point is that, as between employer
and employee, the thing turns on the contract of employment, just as the
House of Lords decided.' 8 7 And, if that contract may be written as above suggested, contrary to the holding in Lister's case, it is plain that the employer
might fail to make out a case. It would not be "just and equitable" to put a
"business risk" on the driver. 188 Nor does this involve the "surprising anom181
See comments by Denning, L.J., in Broom v. Morgan, [1953] 1 Q.B. 597, 607-8: "The
reason for the master's liability is not the mere economic reason that the employer usually
has money and the servant has not. It is the sound moral reason that the servant is doing
the master's business, and it is the duty of the master to see that his business is properly
and carefully done."
182Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461,
31 N.E. 987 (1892).
111 Id., at 468, 989.
181
See the stimulating study by Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" for the Traffic Victim (1954),
ably reviewed by Kalven in 33 Tex. L. Rev. 778 (1955).
18Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y 461,
468, 31 N.E. 987, 989 (1892).
1 See Jackson, History of Quasi-Contract in English Law 118 (1936); Belsheim, The Old
Action of Account, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 466 (1932).
187
Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.).
188Our qourts appear to have fallen into the logical error of supposing that since, in some
cases, the employer should be indemnified, he should in every case. That is, because one
Indian walks in single file, all Indians do. No one could well object to the holding in Latham's
case, for there the conductor had clearly made the tort his own. But the same cannot be
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aly"'
of setting up a double standard: for one is a matter of contract; 190
the other is imposed by a changing social policy for the protection of third
persons. 191 Indeed, it would be a surprising coincidence if the two duties were
the same.
THE GOVERNMENT DRIVER

The issue came up recently in United States v. Gilman,192 with this difference, the driver was employed by the government. The original action was
against the United States, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 193 but the government filed a cross complaint' 94 against Gilman, the driver. Negligence
being established in the original action, the trial court held for the government on its cross complaint, presumably upon the principle that the driver, as
the "real wrongdoer," would be unjustly enriched upon payment by the government of the injured person's claim. Whether Gilman was less than flagrantly careless, did not appear, or if it did, was given no significance. Nor did anyone inquire what his contract was. But, nevertheless, the case was reversed by
the Court of Appeals, 95 upon the interesting though highly tenuous ground
that under the Act, when a third person has obtained judgment against the
government, no further claim may be made against the employee.1 96 Judge
said for Schubert's or Lister's cases. In the latter, if judgment had been taken first against
the driver, he should have been able to recover the amount, or so much as might seem just
and equitable, from his employers, by way of indemnity. See D'Arcy v. Lyle, 5 Binn. (Pa.)
441 (1813).
189Lister v. Romford, [1957] A.C. 555, 586 (H.L.). See note 32 supra.
110
Nor may such a contract be condemned on public policy grounds, as an agreement
to excuse the employee for careless conduct. An agreement to apportion losses is perfectly legal.
See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tompa, 51 F.2d 1032 (C.A.2d, 1931). If this were not true, even
an insurance contract would be subject to criticism.
11 A good illustration is the duty imposed on the employer to maintain safe working conditions. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949), and compare Wilsons & Clyde Coal
Co. v. English, [19381 A.C. 57. Since a corporation may act only through agents, the losses
in these cases must be the fault of personnel. But there is no suggestion whatever that the
employer may automatically put the increasing social burden on them, as the "real wrongdoers.'" Their contract was not geared to such risks. For a review of the "safe place" cases,
see Alderman, What the New Supreme Court has Done to the Old Law of Negligence, 18
Law & Contemp. Prob. 110 (1953).
192347

U.S. 507 (1954).

19360 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C.A. §§1346, 2671 et seq. (1950). The comparable English
statute is the Crown Proceedings Act, 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44 (1947). It does not appear to
have been construed in the circumstances of the Gilman case.
194This procedure was sanctioned in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
" Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (C.A.9th, 1953). This decision was roundly
criticized in the law review case notes: 34 B.U.L. Rev. 120 (1954); 23 Fordham L. Rev. 107
(1954); 8 Miami L.Q. 655 (1954); 28 So. Cal. L. Rev. 176 (1955); 32 Tex. L. Rev. 624 (1954);
7 Vand. L. Rev. 286 (1954); 40 Va. L. Rev. 352 (1954); cf. 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 809 (1954).
1M62 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §2676 (1950). The evident purpose of the provision is
to avoid time-consuming and disturbing litigation involving employees, when by hypothesis
the judgment against the government is good. Lord Holt, in Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472
(1701), cut the non-feasance cases from much the same cloth.
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Pope reasoned that Gilman could not be "unjustly enriched," for "when or if
the government paid the judgment against it, it was not paying a sum which
the employee ought to have paid, for, as we have seen, any obligation on his
part was completely wiped out."

97

It should be said at once that Judge Pope was greatly influenced by a probable legislative purpose to exonerate the employee from any indemnity action
in the situation before the court. When the Act was before Committee, in Congress, the Assistant Attorney General who presented the draft statute was
asked: "What is the arrangement when the government has an employee who
is guilty of gross negligence and injury results? Is there any requirement that
the employee should in any way respond to the government if it has to pay for
the injury in the event of gross negligence?"19 8 To which he replied: "Not if
he is a government employee. Under those circumstances, the remedy is to
fire the employee."' 99 Of course, as a hard-eyed matter, it is one thing to have
no purpose to provide for an indemnity, and another to deny one. The provision forbidding a third person to sue an employee after having obtained judgment against the government, is plainly not such a denial. At best the statute
is silent on the point.
Thus, when the Supreme Court got the case, the question was squarely presented whether it should import the "indemnity" rule applied in private employments. But that was something a unanimous court refused to do, for, as
stated by Mr. Justice Douglas: "That function is more appropriately for those
who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them. 2 0°0 In the
course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that the problem was a
complex one:
We have no way of knowing what the impact of the rule of indemnity we are asked
to create might be. But we do know the question has serious aspects-considerations
that pertain to the financial ability of employees, to their efficiency, to their morale.
20o
These are all important to the Executive Branch.
197 206 F.2d 846, 848 (1953). Both case and result are criticized by Prof. Seavey: "Irrespective of other considerations... indemnity should be granted under the ordinary rules of
restitution because the employee caused a loss which in equity and good conscience should
be paid byhim." Seavey, "Liberal Construction," and the Tort Liability of the Federal Government, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 994, 1002 (1954).
198 Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5573 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong.
2d Sess. 9-10 (1942). This colloquy is set out both in the Supreme Court's opinion and in that
of judge Pope in the Court of Appeals.
199 Ibid. It has been suggested that the Government has never had a right of indemnity
against its employees. Blanton, Subrogation, Indemnity, Contribution and Election of
Remedies Aspects of the Tort Claims Act, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 190, 200 (1954).
200 United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 513 (1954). The result reached in the court
below was approved on this ground: see 63 Yale L. J. 570 (1954).
20LUnited States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 510 (1954). As a matter of fact, as is considered
in Burks v. United States, 116 F.Supp. 337 (S.D.Tex., 1953), the government does have
regulations in some departments which do exempt employees from personal liability except
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It would have been more seemly, at least, had the House of Lords shown a
20 2
similar deference, if not to Parliament,
at least to the facts, before writing
20 3
indemnity.
of
contract
Lister's
FINALLY, AN INSTRUCTION

Thus it would seem, anomaly-wise, that it is the "law" imposed on truck
drivers-that is, on those drivers in private employment who are so unfortunate as to have injured a third person-which is out of step. The driver there
must take the full ultimate loss, in law, if not often in practice. But if by
chance he should have injured a fellow servant (entitled to Workmen's Compensation), the trend is to put the ultimate loss on the industry. If the accident, in either case, was due in some part to the non-feasance of fellow servants
(in failing to keep the truck repaired, for example), there is no direct sanction,
and that applied by the employer, within the business family, is likely to be
met with many off-setting considerations. Finally, if the whole enterprise was
carelessly, but honestly, mismanaged by the directors-thus setting the stage
for trouble-they may be excused entirely, on the theory that, at most, their's
was an error of business judgment. Only when the driver happens to have been
working for the government, is he treated with equal consideration.
Surely that is "anomaly" enough, and to spare. But Lister's case, with its insistence upon contract-however fictitious-has made it easily possible to
work out a non-anomalous result. Truck drivers do not engage, anymore than
store managers and directors do, to hold their principals harmless according
to the test of the reasonable man of the law, who, it seems, "never makes a
slip or a mistake.1 20 4 Their wages are geared more nearly to the cost of living,
than to the increasing hazards of the highway. Nor do they correspond more
closely to the increasing burden of tort liability, which, for social reasons, is
being imposed generally on an expanding industry, amply insured, with no
thought that in the last analysis it should be borne personally by some workingman. So, if the result is to be "liability without fault" in the employer's
case-or even fault without liability in the driver's, at least as to so-called
"when gross negligence is involved." The court, however, at the request of the Attorney
General, ignored the administrative disposition of the case as one not involving gross negligence, and found for the government, on that inflexible principle of the common law, "that
the person actually at fault ultimately should bear the loss resulting from his wrong, and
would be unjustly enriched," etc., etc. Id., at 339.
202
It was urged, it will be recalled (see discussion in text at note 25 supra), that the case
should have been decided as one for contribution under the Law Reform (Married Women
and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935.
203
Probably no member of the court supposed for a moment that Lister, if asked, would
have made such an agreement. See note 22 supra.
20 4
Romford v. Lister, [1956] Q.B. 180, 186 (C.A.). Already, distinctions are being raised;
see Harvey v. O'Dell, [1958] 2 W.L.R. 473.
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business risks--so be it; within the business family the matter is one of con-

tract.
Our action of "indemnity," too, rests on the supposition that truck driversand all other workmen-contract never to make a slip or a mistake. 20 5 For, on
no other premise would it be just and equitable to give the employer his action, without regard to whether the accident was an intentional wrong, or
one which might happen at some time to any competent driver, even as in
Lister's case. But, really, our action merely masquerades as one in equity, for
no one appears to have given any thought to what the employee's contract
might actually be, or as to what the conditions were under which he was re20 6
quired to work.
With deference to Lord Hatherley, therefore, and to make the point of this
article very clear, the following instruction is respectfully suggested as a
proper statement of the law:
You are instructed that, in order to hold for the plaintiff, the employer, you must
find that the accident was one which no driver with any ordinary degree of prudence,
having the same competence and experience as the defendant, using the same equipment, and acting under the same instructions, would ever have had in the course of
2 07
his work.
20

1 In actions for wrongful discharge, where the issue is competence, there is recognition
that the reasonable man test is unrealistic. For example, in Carroll v. Cohen, 28 Del.
233, 91 Atl. 1001 (1914), the court gave this instruction: "Plaintiff [a store manager] must show
a substantial compliance with all the provisions of his contract, and an occasional mistake
which might have been made by any competent manager of such a business is not inconsistent
with a substantial compliance.... On the other hand, mistakes made by plaintiff in the performance of his duties, of a nature that would substantially affect the business of the defendant, is evidence to justify the dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendants. However, the
plaintiff neither insured nor guaranteed the results of his work." Id., at 239, 1003.
201His contract surely is not that of an independent contractor, where indemnity may
be appropriate. Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1903).
Cf. Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1955).

217 The response of the common law to changing social developments "may not be perceptible," as Lord Radcliffe has so well said (note 57 supra), but "no one really doubts" that
"by some means, there is a movement that takes place."

